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Abstract
The expected discovery of petroleum fields that cross the new boundary between Russia and 
Norway in the Barents Sea could mean that both parties will lay claim to the same subsoil resources. 
The Treaty on Maritime Delimitation in the Barents Sea and the Arctic Ocean (Barents Treaty) 
prescribes that such fields should be developed as one unit, governed by a unitization agreement 
between the two governments and a joint operating agreement between license holders on the 
respective sides of the border. Norway has more than 40 years’ experience from the unitization 
of cross-border fields in the North Sea with the United Kingdom. Russia's experience with cross-
boundary petroleum field development is limited to Kazakhstan in the Caspian Sea and onshore, 
where bilateral resource management has been governed by other principles and institutions. While 
the Barents Treaty text clearly reflects the Norwegian way of managing offshore fields, it does 
not preclude the Russian way of doing so. We find reason to believe that both parties will enter 
negotiations over a cross-boundary field in the Barents Sea believing their understanding reflects 
the true concept of unitization. Despite objective differences between Norwegian and Russian 
legislation and practice, there is evidence that the two nations have more in common than not in their 
underlying principles. Discussions are likely to arise regarding the practicalities of implementing 
field unitization, and arriving at a common understanding will probably require some time.
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1. Introduction
Russia and Norway started exploring for hydrocarbons in the Barents Sea around 
1980.1 Claims for exclusive resource rights in a large area on the continental shelf—
some 175,000 square kilometers—were put forward by both the Soviet Union and 
Norway in the late 1970s; and from the early 1980s both countries refrained from 
exploration activity in the disputed area, to avoid conflict. However, after almost 
forty years of negotiations, an agreement was finally reached in 2010, establishing a 
firm delimitation line and dividing the disputed area 50/50 between the two states.2 
This allowed seismic surveys to start there in 2011.
The discovery of petroleum fields that cross the boundary between the two countries 
are expected. In such a case, both parties could lay claim to the same subsoil resources.3
The boundary agreement “Treaty between the Kingdom of Norway and the Russian 
Federation concerning Maritime Delimitation and Cooperation in the Barents Sea 
and the Arctic Ocean ”4 (referred to as the Barents Treaty below) prescribes that such 
fields are to be developed as one unit, governed by a unitization agreement between the 
governments of Russia and Norway, and a joint operating agreement between license 
holders on the respective sides of the border.
The principal research question in this article is whether the two countries are likely 
to differ in their approaches and policies regarding implementation of the unitization 
provisions of the Treaty. We do not attempt to conduct a comprehensive or comparative 
legal analysis of the Barents Treaty in the context of international law, as this has been 
thoroughly discussed by Bankes,5 Henriksen and Ulfstein6 and others. The relationship 
between the Barents Treaty and Russian domestic legislation does, however, constitute 
a gap in the legal literature and is addressed in a companion article by Fodchenko.7
In this article, we are concerned with practice and policies: examining how Norway 
and Russia have approached and solved similar challenges elsewhere. Some policies 
have been codified in agreements and laws; other emanate from experience and tra-
dition. Differences in experience should not be dismissed as inconsequential.8 Even 
though stakeholders realize that the situation ahead is fundamentally new, they remain 
influenced (consciously or subconsciously) by what they perceive as their most relevant 
past experience. The upshot is that rather than risk failure, the parties should investigate 
differences, in order to find ways to manage them before they become problematic.9
We focus on the overarching principles for trans-border petroleum development: 
How have Norway and Russia organized trans-border petroleum development in the 
past, what role has unitization played in the policies of the two countries and how is 
the concept understood. Special attention is given to the determination and apportion-
ment of resources.
The article is structured in four parts:
a. An introduction to the concept of unitization
b. A study of relevant Norwegian experiences with the UK and other jurisdictions
c. A discussion of Russian approaches to cross-boundary discoveries
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d. A discussion on the Barents Treaty and the compatibility of Norwegian and 
Russian experiences, indicating potential sources of mutual misunderstanding.
2. Unitization: Why and How
In the absence of outside regulation, each party with claims to a common resource 
reservoir will rationally maximize its revenues by competitive drilling and aggres-
sive reservoir drainage strategies—causing final resource distribution to deviate from 
initial ownership, and leading to reduced total reservoir recovery.10 For optimal re-
source recovery, a given deposit must be developed as one unit—in turn leading to 
the increasingly common practice of combining ownership rights to a shared reser-
voir through the process of unitization. Unitization may be defined as “the joint, coor-
dinated operation of an oil or gas reservoir by all the owners of rights in the separate 
tracts overlying the reservoir or reservoirs.”11
2.1. Domestic Unitization
Unitization was pioneered in the USA, where many privately owned tracts tended to 
overlie oil reservoirs. An 1889 Pennsylvania court ruling had legalized the rule of cap-
ture: acknowledging that ownership to subsoil oil and gas shifted from the land under 
which it was originally located, to the land tract to which the resource had migrated 
following drilling on that land.12 Over the next 45 years, it was increasingly recog-
nized that competing to capture these fluid resources led to over-drilling, aggressive 
drainage, and reservoir damage wasteful for individual resource owners as well as for 
society. This prompted several states to launch the Interstate Compact to Conserve 
Oil and Gas in 1935,13 obliging signatories to pass legislation to avoid waste of oil 
and gas resources. The subsequent development of state-level “pooling legislation” 
obliged land owners to “pool” (unitize) their interest in petroleum development so 
acreage became of a size believed sufficient to avoid competing entities drilling for 
the same resource.14 As such, these arrangements represented a predecessor to to-
day’s concept of unitization, which, due to a greater understanding of subsoil geol-
ogy, focuses on uniting a specific deposit rather than landowner interests ex-ante.15
Although unitization emerged in response to coordination challenges stemming 
from private ownership to subsoil resources, coordination challenges also arise in 
countries with state ownership of natural resources. Resource management policies 
which restrict each license area while encouraging large numbers of licensees make 
inter-license coordination of paramount importance to the state as the resource 
owner, regardless of licensees’ ownership structures.16
2.2. Cross-border Unitization
A petroleum deposit straddling the border between two countries “can [technically] 
be exploited, wholly or in part, from the other side of the line.”17 However, since uni-
lateral development of such a deposit would imply that one party extracts resources 
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initially in place in the other party’s jurisdiction, thereby affecting this party’s res-
ervoir drainage opportunities, such an activity by one party would violate the other 
country’s exclusive (resource) rights and thereby breach international law.18 To avoid 
such conflicts, the two countries must enter into an agreement on this accord before 
petroleum activity can legally commence.19
Such an agreement needs to account for the same technical and commercial issues 
that apply when a field is unitized within a single national jurisdiction. However, while 
national legislation often provides guidance on principles and procedures for reach-
ing agreement as well as arbitration, international law is, according to Cameron,20 
deficient here, leaving even the most basic arrangements subject to negotiation.
Weaver and Asmus21 examine the technicalities of unitization and its many forms 
across the world in significant, if not exhaustive, detail. Awambu22 points to the fact 
that by crossing national borders, field geology undermines the stability of the con-
tractual framework under which licensees normally operate:
Firstly, a licensee’s opportunity to exploit the resource rights it has negotiated 
with a host government is also constrained by legislation and policy in the adjacent 
jurisdiction.
Secondly, depending on negotiations between host governments and the appor-
tioning of resources between licensees on either side of a border, the final stakes in a 
given field may be changed from what oil companies on both sides of the border had 
originally agreed.
Thirdly, the risk of delays increases, as both countries must approve any significant 
decisions. And, as it is widely assumed that governments are less affected than com-
panies by the time-value of money and therefore the cost of delays, governments may 
be prone to prolong negotiations in order to increase national returns from the field.
These complications translate into increased risk for the companies involved.
2.3. Sharing Resources, Revenues, and Costs
As in any commercial joint venture (JV), the parties must agree on how to share 
costs as well as revenues. A crucial issue in cross-border discoveries is an exact de-
termination of where resources belong. In itself a complicated process, this usually 
determines the division of costs and revenue between the parties.
However, resource determination is not necessarily established early on. The di-
vision of costs and revenues may therefore have to be decided according to expected 
resources on either side of the border. This division may be altered later, as more 
complete information on resources in place is acquired. This process, often referred 
to as redetermination, can be the subject of lengthy disputes (see the Statfjord case, 
below), involving disagreement on reservoir models and interpretation of data by the 
unitized parties and external arbiters.
In principle, there is no requirement that costs and revenues must be divided in 
proportion to the resources in place. Such a division is most common, but govern-
ments remain free to agree on whatever they wish here.
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For investors—oil companies engaged in exploration near the boundary—early 
agreement on principles is vital, to provide predictability in case a cross-boundary 
discovery is made. As agreements between governments tend to be elaborated only in 
response to practical necessity, early agreement may constitute a challenge. The less 
mature a bilateral relationship is in terms of joint petroleum development, the more 
uncertainty is likely to exist.
3. Norway’s Unitization Experience
On the Norwegian continental shelf, 42 fields have been developed as units, of which 
five are cross-border with the United Kingdom: Frigg, Statfjord, Murchison, Blane 
and Enoch.23
Below we discuss the agreements and practical implementation surrounding the 
two largest fields, Frigg and Statfjord. In addition to relations with the UK, Norway 
has signed agreements with Sweden and Iceland and four agreements with Denmark 
pertaining to the border between Norway and Denmark, the Faroe Islands, Green-
land and lastly between Svalbard and Greenland. These all presume unitization in 
the event of a discovery. In the absence of such, we will discuss them here no further, 
as our primary focus is on practical experience from field unitization.
Norway’s agreement with Iceland is the only exception. This agreement introduces 
the concept of a joint development zone, which bears resemblance to Russia’s ar-
rangements with Kazakhstan (see more below). Establishment of a joint develop-
ment zone was put forward by the Soviet side in negotiations with Norway on the 
delimitation of the continental shelf in the Barents Sea around 1990,24 and also pro-
posed by Russian officials later.25
3.1. UK Treaty
The Norway–UK delimitation treaty was signed on March 10, 1965.26 As cross-bor-
der petroleum discoveries were anticipated, its Article 4 included a commitment to 
seek joint development of such resources. This stipulation was the first of its kind 
among international border treaties.27
If any single geological petroleum structure or petroleum field, or any single geological structure 
or field of any other mineral deposit, including sand or gravel, extends across the dividing line 
and the part of such structure or field which is situated on one side of the dividing line is exploit-
able, wholly or in part, from the other side of the dividing line, the Contracting Parties shall, in 
consultation with the licensees, if any, seek to reach agreement as to the manner in which the 
structure or field shall be most effectively exploited and the manner in which the proceeds de-
riving therefrom shall be apportioned.28
Although Article 4 did not explicitly prescribe the procedure, unitization has become 
the parties’ preferred (and indeed only) choice for meeting the obligation to “seek to 
reach agreement” on how a cross-border petroleum deposit “shall be most effectively 
exploited.”
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3.2. Frigg Agreement
When it was discovered in 1971, the Frigg field in the North Sea was the world’s 
largest offshore gas field. Signed on May 10, 1976 and entering into force on July 22, 
1977,29 the Frigg Agreement became Norway’s first unitization agreement. Its key 
principles have proven formative, not only for the unitization of Norwegian fields, but 
it has also provided important precedence for unitization negotiations internation-
ally. It should be noted that Norway30 and the UK31 already had developed petroleum 
management systems with important similarities, notably the common practice of 
giving a license for a field to a group of companies rather than a single company. 
Each company in the group would have a share in the license and invest in devel-
opment (and be rewarded when revenues are created) in the same proportion as its 
ownership in the license. Together the companies form a license or management 
committee. They control the work and approve the plans and budget of the operator, 
one of the shareholders in the license who carries out the actual work on the license 
on behalf of the license group.
To provide a descriptive definition of what a unitization agreement includes and a 
historical point of departure for the discussions to follow, the Frigg agreement’s key 
principles are summarized in the box below.
Frigg Agreement: Main principles
•	 Development of the Frigg resources as one unit (Preamble and Article 1, para. 1)
•	 Apportionment of produced gas according to the initial distribution of resources on either side of the 
border (Article 3, para. 3)
•	 Prescriptions for when a government can request that a process be launched to reassess the initial distri-
bution of resources (redetermination): at the time of first gas and every fourth year thereafter, as well as 
upon discovery of reservoirs communicating with the Frigg reservoir. (Article 3, para. 1)
•	 Historically incurred imbalances in production as measured by the (new) post-redetermination resource 
allocation to be corrected through time-limited adjustments in percentage shares of production until 
such imbalances are settled. (Article 3, para. 3)
•	 License holders shall be taxed in accordance with their “home” jurisdiction. (Article 9, para. 1)
•	 Each government has the right to demand that the license holders in its own and the other government’s 
jurisdictions conclude a Unit Operating Agreement that must be approved by these governments. Any 
changes in the composition of license holders on either side of the border, as well as changes to the 
agreement, require approval from both governments. (Article 1, para. 2)
•	 The Unit Operating Agreement shall appoint one field operator. (Article 5) (Before unitization there is a li-
cense group with one operator on each side of the border. After unitization there will only be one operator.)
•	 An obligation to allow for free flow of personnel and materials over the border, including equal access for 
inspectors from either side, unless security concerns require otherwise. (Article 6, para. 1)
•	 An obligation to align health, security and environmental (HSE) standards and procedures, to the extent 
possible, as well as the possibility for each country to shut down production immediately due to HSE 
concerns at any time. (Article 7, para. 1)
•	 A requirement to agree on the equipment for measuring gas and liquids quantities as well as the meth-
odology for quantification. (Article 22, para. 1)
•	 Conflict resolution procedures: potential conflicts over the size of the deposit or apportionment of re-
sources should first be subject to negotiations in a joint commission (consisting of three members from 
each state) and/or between the countries’ respective governments. If no agreement is reached, the con-
flict is to be resolved by means of arbitration, with one judge from each of the countries and a third judge 
from a third-party country. (Article 28).
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As noted by Smith, the primary responsibility for exploiting the field is left to the 
licensees.32
3.3. Frigg: Redetermination as a Way Forward
After the Norwegian company Norsk Hydro and the Norwegian government ex-
ercised post-discovery options to increase their stake, the Norwegian license had 
the following stakeholder composition: Elf (operator, 27.61 percent), Norsk Hydro 
(32.87 percent), Total Marine (20.71 percent), Aquitaine (13.81 percent), and Sta-
toil (5 percent). Licensees on the British side were Total Marine (operator, 33.33 
percent), Elf (44.45 percent), and Aquitaine (22.22 percent). This stakeholder com-
position proved important in the ensuing negotiations on resource distribution. The 
French companies were perceived by the Norwegian side to be in collusion and bi-
ased in favor of the UK because their shares were larger on the UK license side of the 
border. This impaired trust within the partnership and more importantly between 
the operator and the Norwegian majority stakeholder.33
The principles established by the Frigg Agreement formed the basis from which 
all of Norway’s international as well as national unitization agreements have evolved. 
However, what has become common practice today was not a self-evident outcome at 
the time of negotiations. The 1965 Norway UK delimitation treaty did not oblige the 
parties to reach, only to seek, an agreement. At the time, there was no established prece-
dent for forcing unitization upon the licensees;34 the governments participated from 
the sidelines when negotiations started between the companies to reach an agreement, 
which would later be submitted to their respective governments for formal approval.
According to a historical account of the negotiation process,35 two issues proved 
especially tricky. Firstly, there was great uncertainty over the size of the gas resources, 
as well as allocation between the Norwegian and British sectors. Initial estimates 
indicated that as much as 50 percent of the resources were located in the British 
sector, but Norway believed its share to be much larger. The second issue concerned 
the resource evacuation plan. Norwegian petroleum law required that Norwegian 
resources be landed and processed in Norway; on the British side, however, the Brit-
ish Gas Council was entitled to buy all gas from the British continental shelf. The 
French operators argued for a single pipeline to the UK, whereas the Norwegian 
authorities argued that the Norwegian share of the gas should be landed in Norway.
Both issues stalled field development. At one point, in June 1972, Total even threat-
ened to start development unilaterally, with or without an agreement. Some head-
way was achieved when Norwegian authorities accepted landing the gas in Aberdeen 
and abandoned the idea of parallel evacuation infrastructure to Norway—but in the 
meantime, resource uncertainty had only increased. In an apparent effort to reach 
some form of arrangement, Elf proposed that the parties hire an external consultant 
to determine resource allocation. This served as the foundation for the Frigg Field 
Main Agreement, a principle agreement between the license groups on each side of 
the border, signed in July 1973.36 The field should be developed as one unit, and the 
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participants’ share should be conditioned by original ownership and final resource 
allocation as determined by the consultant. Thus, the final decision on resource allo-
cation was postponed. Initially the consultancy firm, DeGolyer and MacNaughton, 
was to conclude on resource allocation by November 1974, but after preliminary 
results that brought Norway’s share down toward 50 percent were presented to the 
Norwegian authorities, Statoil and Norsk Hydro persuaded the consultant to wait 
until two more wells had been drilled.37 Thereby final decision on resource allocation 
was further postponed; it was still undetermined when Norway and the UK signed 
the Frigg Unitization Agreement in 1976.
The Frigg Agreement not only established unitization as the principle for shared 
fields, it also introduced the redetermination mechanism, whereby unitization and 
field development could proceed, even in the absence of a final agreement on re-
source allocation, size of reserves, as well as field boundaries. This mechanism has 
since proven vital in facilitating investments under conditions of uncertainty over 
resources in place and their allocation.
3.4. Statfjord Agreement
Only two years after the Frigg Agreement, two new unitization agreements were 
signed, for the fields Statfjord38 and Murchison.39 The Statfjord Agreement dwarfed 
the other two in economic importance, as it concerned one of the largest oil fields in 
the North Sea, with total initial reserves of roughly 5 billion barrels of oil equivalent.40
In content, the Statfjord Agreement is almost identical to the Frigg Agreement, but 
with important amendments. The procedures for timing redetermination are further 
elaborated, including a provision for redetermination after drilling of the last well of the 
agreed field development plan, as well as some other timeline amendments. In relation 
to infrastructure, it was agreed to transfer oil directly to tankers for transportation to 
world markets, thereby avoiding discussions on the location of onshore oil terminals.
Although the Statfjord Agreement was dated June 1, 1979, it had, in fact, been 
effective since 1976 on a provisional basis.41 Moreover, by 2009, the Agreement had 
been amended more than 20 times to account for conditions not foreseen in 1976.
It was agreed that field operations would be conducted according to Norwegian 
law, regulations and requirements, as the platforms and other infrastructure were 
situated on the Norwegian side of the border. Voting rules required 70 percent of the 
licensees to reach a binding decision, with a few exceptions. Most importantly, re-ap-
portioning reserves and permitting the use of Statfjord’s facilities by other petroleum 
fields would require unanimous approval, although each party had the right to raise 
these issues.42 Both proved to be matters of serious and recurring discussions.
3.5. Redetermination as a Recurring Headache
Redetermination has received significant attention in the unitization agreements be-
tween Norway and the UK. It started as a consequence of a compromise (Frigg), 
evolved into procedures fixed in the bilateral unitization agreement by the two 
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Governments (Statfjord), and, since the 2005 framework agreement, has become a 
prerogative of the companies involved.
To understand the complications that may arise from resource negotiations, one 
must bear in mind that total reserves as well as allocation between sectors cannot 
be determined accurately—only estimated. Nor is such estimation a straightforward 
exercise; the results depend on the choice of assumptions, methodology, and other 
aspects. However, agreeing on a given estimate may be even harder, as shown by the 
Statfjord redeterminations. The account of one of the participants in the process 
from the Norwegian side, Håkon Lavik, is rendered in abbreviated form and authors’ 
wording in the remainder of this section.43
The ownership of Statfjord Unit was redetermined many times after the initial 
ownership split had been set at 88.88 percent to Norway and 11.12 percent to the 
UK in 1976. Already at first oil in 1979, this was changed to 84.09 percent to Nor-
way and 15.91 percent to the UK. This was, in fact, a significant change, given the 
size of the field; Lavik speculates that the Norwegian side agreed to terms it consid-
ered unreasonable in order to avoid postponing development, hoping it would have a 
chance to regain later what had been lost.
Even though the Norwegian side felt the UK already held an unfair share, the UK 
requested another redetermination in 1985, hoping to increase its own share further. 
However, it quickly became clear that Norway would benefit from redetermination; 
indeed, when the operator (Mobil) presented its recommendation, Norwegian own-
ership was set to increase, back to around 88 percent.
Prolonged disagreement ensued, in which neither side abided by the procedures 
stipulated in the unitization agreement, and there were mutual accusations of foul 
play. The UK side repeatedly sought to undermine estimation results by requesting 
new data; the Norwegian side reacted by delaying its compliance with the British 
requests. Sixty meetings were held between 1985 and 1989, without bringing the 
parties any closer to a solution.
In 1989, the Energy Minister of the UK called for a political solution to the dis-
pute, a solution that would in fact violate the unitization agreement, which prescribed 
arbitration. However, the Norwegian government was reluctant to launch arbitration 
processes against the UK, and so the Minister’s request was simply ignored. Instead, 
the parties decided to start anew in 1989, and silently forget about the 1985 process.
As before, the conclusion reached by the operator involved increasing the Nor-
wegian share, which was rejected by the British. The license holders then recom-
mended commissioning an expert review by DeGolyer and MacNaughton, which 
in 1991 ruled to increase ownership by 1.15 percentage points in favor of Norway. 
This changed the ownership distribution to 14.76 percent and 85.24 percent for the 
British and Norwegian sides, respectively.
Since the unitization agreement authorized redetermination every four years, the 
Statfjord partners had to consider launching a new process only two years later, in 
1993. However, there was not enough time to collect new data to substantiate new 
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estimates. Moreover, according to the unitization agreement, redetermination could 
continue at four-year intervals until production ended—and it was becoming clear 
that in case of further rulings in favor of Norway, the British side would not have 
enough reserves left to compensate Norway for earlier British excess earnings. Against 
this background, it was decided to have one final redetermination starting in 1995.
First, the parties had to circumvent the unitization agreement, so that redeter-
mination could be launched before another four years had passed, when it might 
be too late for the British to pay back in oil. As before, the parties failed to reach 
agreement, and called for an expert verdict. However, the parties could not agree on 
an expert, so, in line with the procedures for expert appointment, the decision came 
to involve drawing lots between the candidates from the Norwegian and the British 
side in the operating committee, which the Norwegian license holders subsequently 
won. Thereupon the UK ministry exercised its right to veto the appointment of the 
independent expert, sending the process into a stalemate.
Lavik argues that the British were still bent on regaining what had been lost in 
the 1989 process; and that, realizing this, the Norwegians eventually conceded that 
agreement would have to be reached outside the logic of geological analysis.
Prolonged negotiations followed; the Norwegian partners even tried, unsuccess-
fully, to placate the British by offering a symbolic increase in ownership. Finally, in 
1997, the parties agreed that there would be no changes in the ownership structure, 
effectively sidestepping the procedures outlined in the unitization agreement. How-
ever, it was necessary to get UK authorities onboard. The oil companies on the UK 
side were granted a postponement in paying back oil which they had disproportion-
ately received, thus gaining a net present value advantage at a time when they had 
other significant investments in other fields on the UK shelf.
The UK Department of Trade and Industries and the Norwegian Ministry of Pe-
troleum and Energy finally accepted this arrangement in 1998, granting coordinated 
approvals of the joint operating agreement. The ownership shares remained at 85.47 
percent for the Norwegian side and 14.53 percent for the British. By 2017, oil pro-
duction from the field had fallen to a fraction of what it was at its peak in the late 
1980s and early 1990s. Output of gas and natural gas liquids was growing, however, 
because of new investment in the field.44
3.6. Framework Agreement
In expectation of further cross-border discoveries, the Norwegian and UK govern-
ments launched a joint working group in January 2002, the UK–Norway North Sea 
Co-operation Workgroup. The workgroup issued a report, “Unlocking Value Through 
Closer Relationships,”45 that valued the potential benefit from efficiency improve-
ments in cooperation on development of the North Sea petro-resources to USD 
2 billion. The working group recommended entering into a framework agreement 
with accompanying guidelines, to ease future cooperation processes. It also identified 
some barriers to cooperation, including unaligned fiscal systems, the limited capacity 
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of the connection to the St. Fergus gas terminal, and insufficient information on 
pipeline capacity.
In October 2003, the UK and Norwegian Energy Ministers issued a joint state-
ment, two paragraphs long, under the heading “A win–win approach.” The statement 
highlighted the scope for cooperation and the high trust between the parties, and 
outlined principles to be incorporated in the forthcoming framework agreement on 
cross-border cooperation.46
In April 2005, Norway and the UK agreed on a framework agreement that not 
only prescribed compulsory unitization of cross-border fields but also limited the 
room for intergovernmental field-by-field negotiations and improved coordination 
between regulatory authorities in both countries—in the hope of smoothing the 
forthcoming unitization processes.47 The procedure for redetermination was trans-
ferred from the unitization agreement to the operating agreement. The definition, 
measurement and evaluation of initial reserves were also to be agreed by the license 
holders in the operating agreement and subsequently approved by the respective 
authorities. Bankes defines the framework agreement as an international pioneer, 
which has since been followed by four international agreements covering areas where 
petroleum resources have yet to be found, one of which is the Barents Treaty.48
3.7. Treaty With Iceland Opens Up for Simplified Resource Distribution
On October 22, 1981, Norway and Iceland concluded a treaty on continental shelf 
delimitation.49 The agreement specified a certain area—“the cooperation area”—
where, upon commencement of petroleum activity by one party, the other party is 
entitled to participate with 25 percent. Bankes highlights the arrangement’s unique-
ness in establishing an Arctic joint development area and its non-legalistic approach 
to reaching an agreement and apparent concessions by Norway, based on notions of 
what might be accepted by the parties as ‘a reasonable solution’ rather than focusing 
on formal legal ‘rights’.50
On March 20, 2007, Icelandic authorities announced plans for issuing exploration 
and development licenses in the “cooperation area.” The Icelandic and Norwegian gov-
ernments then set about negotiating an agreement for cross-border petroleum field de-
velopment, which was signed on November 3, 2008.51 According to this agreement, field 
development cannot commence before a unitization agreement has been concluded.
On January 4, 2013, Petoro, the Norwegian state-owned company managing 
the  Norwegian state’s direct participation in licenses, signed an agreement on 
participating in the second licensing round in Iceland with 25 percent ownership 
interest in two licenses.52 In view of the need to agree on a budget and a time-
line for seismic operations, it “could take some time” before exploration drilling 
could commence.53 On November 26, 2013, Petoro entered into a third license 
in Iceland together with Chinese CNOOC International and Icelandic Eykon 
 Energy.54 By 2016, it was estimated that drilling could commence between 2022 
and 2026.55
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3.8. Lessons Learned from Norway’s Delimitation and Unitization Agreements
Summing up the preceding sections, the following insights stand out as particularly 
relevant before embarking on an assessment of Russia’s experience:
1.  Median line-based delimitation and unitization agreements have been Nor-
way’s preferred tool for managing cross-border fields.
2.  Redetermination has been an important mechanism to avoid negotiation 
stalemate and move forward in spite of resource uncertainty.
3.  On the other hand, redetermination has also had the potential to instate a 
situation of perpetual negotiations draining management resources and cre-
ating uncertainty about final outcomes. Redetermination processes are also 
very expensive, costing several hundred million Norwegian kroner each time.
4.  Notwithstanding close historical ties, a similar institutional environment and 
licensee composition, the scope for disagreement and protracted negotiating 
has been significant.
5.  The choice of infrastructure and marketing solutions (e.g. gas pipelines for 
Frigg) and allocation of common infrastructure (e.g. Statfjord-Brent vs. tim-
ing of production from Norwegian satellites) have also proven to be subjects 
of tough debate. While agreements have evolved in order to efficiently handle 
the tricky resource distribution exercise, infrastructure issues remain without 
procedural guidance.
4. Russia’s Approach to Cross-boundary Discoveries
Russia has far more experience in the petroleum industry than Norway, but this ex-
perience derives overwhelmingly from onshore activities.
During the Soviet period, petroleum exploration and extraction were conducted 
by territorially based state-owned entities. With any discovery, the borders of the field 
were defined and the field was subsequently registered in the state inventory. These 
already-defined fields served as the basis for the post-Soviet licenses, given to the 
oil companies established on the basis of the former state production associations. 
Overlapping or conflicting claims to hydrocarbons in these licenses have been rare. 
However, such claims have emerged when resources in a newly awarded license area 
extend into a neighboring license. A solution has been for one license owner to take 
over the other. Licenses as such cannot readily be sold, but companies can. Therefore 
a common procedure is to form a company for each license sought.56 An alternative 
is to form a joint venture company for development, without any strict delineation of 
the resource base. In either case, the need for strict delineation of the resource base is 
avoided, and the principle of awarding a license to one company is preserved.
Because of their impact on regional tax revenues, there have been disputes between 
federation subjects in cases involving hydrocarbon discoveries that cross administra-
tive borders. However, a 2010 change in the taxation law transferred 100 percent 
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of the minerals tax to the federal budget.57 Much of this tax income gets redistrib-
uted to the regional level, but according to other criteria than the actual location of 
resources. Remaining special taxes are paid where the larger part of the petroleum 
deposit is located. Since 2004, licenses for exploration and development are issued 
solely by the federal authorities.58 These developments have subdued disputes over 
trans-regional resources.
The need to find an arrangement in case of international trans-border discoveries 
became evident in the aftermath of the breakup of the Soviet Union. An agreement 
on delimitation of the exclusive economic zone and continental shelf in the Baltic 
Sea was signed with Lithuania in 1997.59 However, it merely declared that the parties 
would seek to reach agreement in accordance with international laws and recognized 
principles in the case of a cross-border field; and that the right of each party to re-
sources on its continental shelf should be respected. That agreement failed to estab-
lish specific mechanisms for cooperation in the development of transboundary fields.
In 1998, a delimitation agreement with Kazakhstan was signed, based on the prin-
ciple of a modified median line.60 As observed by Smith and Ashley Roach, eco-
nomic considerations were important to both states.61 However, unitization was not 
mentioned explicitly. The agreement only stated that the parties would apportion 
resources in cross-border fields according to “established international practice.” The 
delimitation line itself was not defined. Until such time, companies that conducted 
exploration activities would be considered representatives of the parties; if fields or 
prospects were identified, these companies would have priority claim to licenses, but 
would also be obligated to involve a representative from the other party.
However, other solutions to developing cross-boundary deposits were also put for-
ward. In 1998, Ulianov and Diachkova described the background for and implemen-
tation of unitization schemes internationally, and argued for their relevance both in 
relation to petroleum fields crossing license boundaries as well as borders between 
federation subjects or international borders. Their work was initiated by the Ministry 
of Fuel and Energy. This shows that at a relatively early stage the concept and use 
of unitization was known, at least in parts of the Russian petroleum management 
bureaucracy.
4.1. Practical Experience
The delimitation line between Russia and Kazakhstan remained without fixed coor-
dinates until 2002, when the two countries agreed on a protocol to their delimitation 
agreement, determining ownership and participation rights to two structures and 
one field.62
Even though unitization had not become a legal term in Russia, the main purpose 
of unitization had become a key concern, as the protocol prescribed that each field 
or structure would be developed as one unit. Russia would have sovereign resource 
rights and development would be under Russian legislation on the Tsentralnaya 
structure and the Khvalynskoe field, whereas Kazakhstan would have such rights on 
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the Kurmangazy (Kulalinskaya) structure in the northernmost part of the Caspian. 
For each structure or field, a joint project was envisaged, with each Party holding 50 
per cent as a point of departure.63
Thus, costs and resources would not be split in proportion to the distribution of 
resources on either side of the border, but according to the shares in projects, which 
were, rather schematically, divided fifty/fifty. However, the Party not holding the re-
source rights would have the option to take a smaller share if it wanted to.
The set-up was simple, not requiring meticulous assessments and apportionment of 
the resource base. The rules on organization of activities were short on detail, beyond 
stating that it could be any form of joint activity, but referred to as an enterprise.64
In the years that followed, obstacles to development did not emanate from the bi-
lateral protocol, however, but from internal Russian policies. In 2003, a joint venture 
company, TsentrKaspneftegaz, was established to explore the Tsentralnaya structure. 
Lukoil and Gazprom held 25 per cent each and Kazmunaigaz of Kazakhstan 50 
percent.65 In 2008 a discovery was made by the joint venture, but by 2009 Lukoil 
as a private Russian company had been banned from new offshore licenses, and 
the license renewal process (from exploration to development license) stalled. Only 
in 2016, after the prohibition on private companies was softened, was the license 
renewed, allowing a new joint venture between the same companies with the same 
shares – Neftegazovaya kompaniya Tsentralnaya.66
In 2005, another joint venture company was created for development of the Khva-
linskoe structure – Kaspiyskaya neftegazovaya kompaniya, owned fifty-fifty by Kaz-
munaigaz and Lukoil. In 2009, the Kazakh company sold 25 percent to Total and 
GdF Suez. 67 Once again, internal Russian regulations gave rise to complications, as 
the project was not given permission to export the gas, only supply it to domestic mar-
kets, because of Gazprom’s export monopoly.68 It seems that development will con-
tinue to be stalled until an arrangement with Gazprom for export to China is found.69
An attempt at joint development was also made in connection with the onshore 
Imashevskoe field, discovered in 1985 on what was to become the Russian–Kazakh 
land border.70 In 2002, Gazprom and Kazmunaigaz formed а 50–50 joint venture 
company, KazRosGaz, which produced the first gas from Imashevskoe in 2007, ac-
cording to company sources.71 The situation remained unsettled because even though 
Russia and Kazakhstan had agreed in 2013 to develop the field, a development li-
cense could not be issued, reportedly because of conflicting and insufficient legal 
provisions in the two countries.72 In 2016, the Russian Ministry of Natural Resources 
found a temporary solution: it concluded that a license could be issued to the JV for 
geological work and exploration. However, when an auction for the license was to be 
organized, no company expressed interest.73
Even though the protocol between Russia and Kazakhstan seemingly opened for 
various forms of cooperation, the practical arrangements for all projects with Ka-
zakhstan where Russia has the resource rights reflect the modus operandi in Russia 
when fields cross boundaries, namely the establishment of joint venture companies. 
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But in the case of the Kurmangazy structure, which is under Kazakh jurisdiction, 
the parties agreed to let a Kazakh company take care of the practical work – as 
an operator.74
4.2. Development of Principles
Despite the dominance of the joint development approach and simplified apportion-
ment of resources in Russian practice, Russian authorities have taken steps to de-
velop more sophisticated schemes for the unitization of trans-border fields and fields 
crossing domestic administrative or license boundaries. Thus, in 2007, the Ministry 
of Natural Resources ordered the State Commission for Mineral Reserves (GKZ) 
of the Federal Subsoil Management Agency to produce a set of “Recommendations 
on assessment of reserves in adjoining and trans-boundary deposits”, which were 
subsequently approved for use by the Ministry.75 It was still an operative document 
as of 2017. The Recommendations contain a clause stating that the document does 
not consider borders dividing fields on Russia’s continental shelf “which fall under 
the jurisdiction of the international law of the sea”. Given the general nature of the 
Recommendations, this sounds more like a formality than any real limitation on their 
potential applicability. They deserve attention as the only official document, to the 
knowledge of the authors of this article, that discusses unitization in some detail. The 
content is wider than the title of the document suggests.
The Recommendations explicitly take the principle of unitization “as used in world 
practice” as their point of departure (paragraph 5). Unitization is briefly defined as 
“consolidation [obyedinenie] of resource users for joint use of resources” (paragraph 
5), but it is also stated that the purpose of a unitization agreement is to establish a uni-
fied accounting of costs and revenues with “subsequent division of these incomes and 
expenditures proportionally to the reserves belonging to each of the resource users” 
(paragraph 7). The document details a process for the determination of reserves. It is 
recognized that differences in tax regimes may influence the amount of recoverable 
resources on either side of the border, and that governments involved may agree to 
establish a single tax regime for the whole field (paragraph 30). Parties should agree 
to periodical redetermination of resources in the event of new data (paragraph 26).
Thus, the major purpose and principle of unitization is understood in the same 
way as in the various Norwegian agreements. However, these GKZ recommenda-
tions differ considerably from Norwegian practice when it comes to organization of 
activities. The document states that “… all parts of the field should be developed on 
the basis of a unified technological scheme, a unified plan for development” (para-
graph 7), but does not spell out who is actually going to do this. For joint assessment 
of reserves, the parties should appoint an external company to conduct the resource 
assessment (paragraph 42), but the results are not binding (paragraph 44). Resource 
assessment by a third party as the default approach differs from the Norwegian prac-
tice where resource assessments are conducted by the license committee, led by the 
license operator.76
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The recommendations also propose the establishment of a special body “for co-
ordination of work and operative solution of problems emerging” (paragraph 43). 
Such a body could be led by one of the two parties on a rotation basis. “This special 
body (company) must be delegated sufficient authority to manage all processes 
relating to resource assessments and reporting to the government agencies.” It is 
unclear exactly how broad a scope is intended, but such an organization would 
appear to have responsibility for the duties performed by a license committee in 
Norway, as well as functions performed by the field development operator. In a 
Norwegian context, licenses on each side of the border would be represented by 
the respective license operator; and establishing any joint organization would be 
considered premature.
The GKZ recommendations are not a set of draft regulations for unitization; they 
are only proposals for the exploration phase, when resource allocations are still un-
known. Yet they represent a fairly comprehensive set of principles. Nevertheless, it is 
worth noting that they have not been further elaborated, whether in general regula-
tions for trans-boundary resource development or in the specific agreements negoti-
ated with Kazakhstan since 2007.
5. The Norwegian–Russian Barents Treaty
5.1. Main Elements
The “Treaty between the Kingdom of Norway and the Russian Federation con-
cerning Maritime Delimitation and Cooperation in the Barents Sea and the Arctic 
Ocean” was signed in 2010 and entered into force in 2011. Its provisions concerning 
cross-border fields have many similarities with the 1965 Norway–UK Treaty and 
the 2005 Norway–UK Framework Agreement, but with a stronger commitment to 
unitize. Such a commitment was already established in a 2007 agreement between 
Norway and Russia on a boundary line close to the shore in the Varanger Fjord, but 
in less detail.77
According to the Barents Treaty, the parties to the Treaty, Russia and Norway, 
are required to enter into a unitization agreement. It is further specified that such 
an agreement is to involve the development of a cross-boundary field as one unit, 
and that the resources are to be divided according to their location: “…agreement 
on the exploitation of the hydrocarbon deposit as a unit, including its apportion-
ment between the Parties, shall be reached at the request of one of the Parties.” 
This crucial latter requirement differs from the approach in the arrangements 
Russia has concluded with Kazakhstan, but is in line with the recommendations 
from the GKZ.
Some of the elements previously covered in unitization agreements are elevated to 
treaty level. This resembles the 2005 Norway–UK Framework Agreement, as it clar-
ifies some principle issues prior to discovery, such as redetermination preconditions 
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and arbitration procedures, as well as a project management model with one operator 
and a distribution of shares in accordance with resources, while leaving other mat-
ters, like specific reservoir assessment methodology and decision making procedures, 
to be negotiated later.
Annex II, which forms an integral part of the 2010 Treaty, provides guidelines for 
the unitization process, but is not a unitization agreement in itself. The annex was al-
legedly also supposed to demonstrate in concrete terms what unitization would mean 
since many Russian stakeholders were expected to be unfamiliar with the concept.
According to Annex II of the Barents Treaty, a unitization agreement must include
•	 data on the reserves in place as well as methodology for determination of 
reserves
•	 distribution of the resource between the parties
•	 mutual access to geological data.
All these elements are similar to the 2007 GKZ recommendations. However, the 
obligation of license holders on each side to establish a “Joint Operating Agreement 
to regulate the exploitation of the transboundary hydrocarbon deposit” has no par-
allel in the GKZ recommendations. Such an agreement is a standard requirement in 
Norway, however, and regulates the relations between the various part-owners of a 
license and the operator.78
A procedure for redetermination is not mandatory, nor is it sufficient that one party 
should require it. Annex II, article 4 of the Treaty only includes the clause “the Par-
ties may agree that the hydrocarbon deposit shall be reapportioned between them.” 
Periodical redetermination was included in the GKZ recommendations. However, 
the somewhat modest suggestion in Annex II would seem to reflect Norway’s mixed 
experience from the North Sea. The advantage seen with a redetermination mecha-
nism in the case of Frigg was that it allowed investments to start before apportion-
ment of resources was settled. However, given the problems and costs incurred with 
redetermination on Statfjord, it seems unlikely that development would start in the 
Barents Sea before a high level of consensus is reached on the resource base and its 
apportionment.
In the Barents Treaty, in contrast to the GKZ recommendations, arbitration in the 
case of disagreement is binding. Moreover, if disagreement concerns apportionment 
of the deposit, an independent expert shall be appointed by the parties. His decision 
is binding. Such a procedure will limit the potential for one party to use apportion-
ment discussions to slow down development.
The Treaty provides for the establishment of a “Joint Commission for consul-
tations between the Parties on issues pertaining to any planned or existing unit-
ized hydrocarbon deposits.” This is clearly intended as an inter-governmental body 
for each field development, but with no direct authority in the direct conduct of 
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operations. Still, it appears to cover part of the role of the special organ proposed in 
the GKZ recommendations.
6. Norwegian and Russian Approaches: Overlaps or Inconsistencies?
As no cross-border fields have yet been discovered, and talks between Norwegian and 
Russian authorities are still at an early stage, we can only hypothesize about how the 
parties might approach implementation of the Barents Treaty if a discovery is made.
The Barents Treaty’s annex on transboundary hydrocarbon deposits largely reflects 
Norway’s management of cross-border fields with the UK for more than 40 years. 
But this does not mean unitization is seen as unproblematic, from a Norwegian point 
of view. Despite the apparent cultural and institutional closeness between Norway 
and the UK, implementing the Norway–UK unitization agreements has not been 
without friction. The tendency to politicize decisions on resource distribution—first 
with the Frigg field, and then later Statfjord (Brent)—probably led to the decision 
to leave it to the companies to determine resource shares, limiting governmental 
involvement, when the Framework Agreement between Norway and the UK was 
signed in 2005. In the Barents Treaty, however, initial determination and appor-
tioning of reserves are placed on the government level, in the unitization agreement. 
This may be interpreted as recognition of the more state-centered approach typical 
of Russian practice.
On the other hand, some lessons learned from the North Sea seem to have found 
their way into the Barents Treaty. In contrast to the Statfjord Agreement, which in-
cluded a scheduled redetermination processes, in the Barents Treaty both sides must 
agree before such a process can be launched. Of course, in the face of great resource 
uncertainty, the parties might want to include a unilateral redetermination clause 
when the unitization agreement is negotiated. But as of today, each side has the op-
tion of avoiding redetermination. This must be seen against the backdrop of the high 
costs of redetermination experienced with Frigg and Statfjord.
While the Barents Treaty text clearly reflects the Norwegian way of managing 
offshore fields, it does not rule out the Russian approach, which is quite different. In 
the Russian context, trans-border fields have been managed by joint venture compa-
nies, special organizations set up with the participation of involved license holders. 
The Norwegian approach has been to appoint one of the license holding companies 
as operator. Further, the general understanding in Norway is that JV companies 
are difficult to organize and involve high transaction costs, since it means bringing 
together people, technology and procedures from two or more organizations in a 
new company.
One reason why the Russian side might have a preference for the joint venture 
company model is that such a structure might be seen as a vehicle for the transfer of 
technology and know-how between western and Russian companies. However, such 
objectives may also be met by obliging the operator to include Russian personnel in 
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the project organization, without reneging on the principal features of the Norwe-
gian operator model.
The term ‘operator’ in the Barents Treaty is in itself open to various interpretations 
and may become a matter for discussion.79 Actual arrangements in the Caspian Sea 
differ even further from the Norwegian unitization experience, although these ar-
rangements imply developing each involved field as one unit.
The Barents Treaty obliges the parties to follow a certain procedure for unitization. 
However, if both agree, they may decide to find other solutions when they negotiate a 
unification agreement for a given trans-border deposit. This could be relevant if, for 
instance, a very large share of a transboundary field is located on one side of the bor-
der.  According to the approach suggested in the Treaty, unitization will undoubtedly 
entail significant transaction costs, so it might make commercial sense for the party 
with the smaller share of the resources to sell its share at a fixed price or according to 
some formula, and not take part in developing the field. Another possibility would be 
a model resembling Russia’s approach in the Caspian Sea, where rights to resources 
in known structures straddling the median line border were distributed among the 
parties as part of the delimitation treaty, but where each party was given a 25–50 
percent stake in projects that would end up on the other side of the border. The 
Norway–Iceland agreement also has some similarities, defining interests in a joint 
development zone.
However, given the possibility of a more accurate division of resources, as seen in the 
North Sea, such crude arrangements as those employed in the Caspian would likely 
appear as a step backwards, from a Norwegian perspective. The arrangement with 
Iceland came about in response to specific circumstances and Norway made impor-
tant concessions.80 The situation between Norway and Russia is very different, and the 
agreement with Iceland is probably not seen as relevant by the Norwegian authorities.
Nevertheless, fixing the distribution of resources at an early stage might be practi-
cal, even for larger fields. In hindsight, we see that the outcome of the early Frigg ne-
gotiations could just as well have been that the parties had agreed upon fixed shares 
in the field rather than opting for the redetermination mechanism. Given Russian 
practices for “sealing the deal,” similar proposals might be expected concerning the 
Barents Sea, at an early stage in exploration.
If we compare Norwegian and Russian project organization, Norwegian license 
committees appear to be a simpler solution than the joint venture companies that 
have been the dominant model for inter-company cooperation in Russia. As Sta-
toil`s agreements with Rosneft from 2012 show, even at a very early stage the project 
was organized into a separate company with its own staff, office, and other ameni-
ties.81 The Shtokman project, which involved establishing a special purpose company, 
demonstrated how expensive setting up a joint venture that ends in nothing can be.82
Norwegian deal-making gives the impression of tediousness and complexity, 
whereas Russia has demonstrated a preference for simplicity in contractual relations. 
However, such simplicity has not always been advantageous for practical project 
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implementation. Stumbling blocks are swift to appear once the ink has dried on gov-
ernment protocols.
Problems may arise not only on the inter-state level. Development of the Tsen-
tralnoe field in the Caspian Sea missed out on one high oil-price cycle because the 
Russian government was slow in issuing a license to Lukoil. First, the company was 
barred from getting a production license in 2008; then the process was kept in limbo 
until 2015—by which time prices had fallen again. In the Barents Sea, however, mat-
ters seem simpler. State dominated Rosneft is the license holder on the Russian side 
and should be a safeguard against institutional hitches. Still, problems may emerge if 
a gas discovery is made. For years, Rosneft has battled with Gazprom for the right to 
export gas, and has so far received only limited rights to export LNG.83
In the event of a gas discovery, Norway and Russia would have to agree on re-
source evacuation and possibly a marketing strategy—matters of obvious strategic 
significance. Such situations emerged during the initial discussions on the Frigg field 
and again in connection with the Caspian Sea. The Barents Treaty offers no specific 
provisions in this regard. Negotiations might prove complicated, as the companies’ 
commercial considerations interact with national strategic priorities. Obviously, it 
might be that neither side finds a gas development sufficiently interesting.
In any case, the relationship and division of roles between companies and the au-
thorities differ in the Norwegian and the Russian oil industries. In the Barents Sea, 
the parties have yet to explore and agree on organizational models for joint activities 
that can be compatible with the respective institutional environments. For compa-
nies holding licenses on either side of the border this amounts to major uncertain-
ties concerning timing, shape and ultimately the profitability of development. Such 
considerations could make them reluctant to invest in exploration in the first place.
7. Concluding Reflections
This study has examined Norwegian and Russian experiences from managing oil and 
gas fields that cross license borders, as well as borders with neighboring countries, 
because we believe this is relevant for implementation of the Barents Treaty. Both 
parties will, consciously or subconsciously, expect unitization to take a form already 
familiar to them, letting prior experiences shape their approaches to new challenges.
Russian recommendations for cross-border fields claim to build on the interna-
tional concept of unitization. However, Russian ideas about unitization differ from 
the way Norway has unitized fields with neighboring countries, and between licenses 
on the Norwegian continental shelf.
Our analysis has found objective differences between Norwegian and Russian leg-
islation and practice, but it has also found that the underlying principles and thinking 
of Norway and Russia have much in common. It seems safe to conclude that there is 
agreement on the primary purpose and advantage of unitization, namely developing 
a cross-boundary deposit as one unit. When it comes to more secondary issues, the 
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approaches of the two countries are different: apportionment of resources between 
the parties has been carried out differently, and the organization of joint activities 
also clearly differs.
It seems likely that, in the event of cross-border discoveries, both parties will enter 
negotiations in the belief that their own understanding of unitization reflects the true 
or most workable realization of the concept, expecting the other party to share their 
view, under the assumption that there is only one correct, true approach. Discussion 
is likely to arise around the practicalities of implementing field unitization. The dif-
ferences here are not insurmountable, although arriving at a joint understanding will 
probably take time. Ultimately, much will depend on both parties’ interest in devel-
oping transboundary fields.
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